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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lawrence James Crow appeals from the district court's sentencing order 
that he pay a $5,000 fine pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307, and denial of his I.C.R. 35 
motion for reduction of sentence, following his guilty plea to attempted first 
degree murder. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
According to the presentence investigation report ("PSI"), Crow's 
underlying crime occurred as follows: 
The police reports state that on July 22, 2010, Deputy Hardwicke, 
of the Bingham County Sheriffs Department, responded to the 
Bingham Memorial Hospital to contact the victim of a shooting. A 
few minutes after he arrived the ambulance arrived with the victim, 
Jessica Martinez. Jessica was conscious, but she was crying and 
moaning from the pain. Once she was stabilized Deputy Hardwicke 
observed that she had a gunshot wound to her left forearm. There 
was also a lump above the injury and she had a bloody injury to her 
left pinky finger. She also had blood splatter over most of her body. 
Deputy Hardwicke talked to Dr. Gelwix who told him the bullet had 
split into two pieces, one lodged near the entrance wound and the 
other piece lodged near her elbow. He said the injuries were not 
life threatening and she would probably be released with an 
appointment to see a surgeon to remove the fragments and repair 
the damage. 
Deputy Hardwicke then talked to Jessica about the incident. She 
told him the person who shot her was Lawrence Crow. She said 
they had been together for six years and had a two-year-old son 
together. About a year ago Lawrence had [sic] began to physically 
abuse her by hitting her on her face and on her body. She said she 
finally had enough of the abuse and left him about a month ago. 
Since she left him, Lawrence had been stalking her and trying to 
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get her to come back to him. That day Lawrence had their son for 
a visit and was to return him to her about noon. She saw Lawrence 
drive into her driveway and then back out and leave. She said she 
believed that Lawrence was expecting her to be alone, but saw that 
her mother's car was in the driveway. 
A short time later Jessica drove to Lawrence's mother's residence 
in Blackfoot to pick-up her son. When she arrived she spoke to 
Lawrence and saw that her son was there. Lawrence wanted to 
talk to her about their relationship and she agreed to talk for a few 
minutes only. They went to the porch to talk and sat down. They 
spoke for a few minutes when Lawrence became agitated and 
started calling her a bitch. She then realized that he had been 
drinking and asked him about it. His reply was, "Yeah, what if I 
am?" She said she was leaving and stood up to get her son and 
go. She then realized the door was locked and knocked on the 
door. She also dialed 911 on her phone, but did not push send. 
Lawrence then stood up and said, "If I can't have you, no one can" 
and pulled a gun out of his right front pants pocket. He held the 
gun in his hand and said, "I got this for you" in a threatening 
manner and pointed the gun at her. She screamed and ran into the 
house through the door which had now been unlocked by someone 
inside. She dialed 911 as he chased her. He confronted her, 
getting very close to her, and racked the slide on the gun as if he 
was chambering a round. He pointed the gun at her face and then 
at her chest with the gun only a few inches away from her body. 
Jessica said she pushed the gun away from her chest and 
Lawrence was trying to push it back into her chest. Lawrence then 
fired the gun and she felt her left arm burning. She realized that 
she had been shot and ran into the bathroom, locking the door. 
She heard the gun fire again once or twice and thought he was 
trying to shoot the door open. He then got the door open and came 
inside. She hugged him saying she was sorry and would come 
back to him. She said she was telling him what she thought he 
wanted to hear so he would not shoot her again. He eventually 
loosened his grip on the gun and she grabbed it and handed it to 
Janae Penrod who is Lawrence's younger sister. She added that 
when he pointed the gun at her she thought he was going to kill her 
and she feared for her life during the incident. 
(PSI (Def. Ex. 2), pp.1-2.) 
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The state charged Crow with attempted first degree murder and domestic 
battery involving traumatic injury in the presence of a child, with sentencing 
enhancements for use of a firearm during the commission of a crime and 
inflicting great bodily injury. (R., pp.81-83.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crow 
entered an Alford1 plea of guilty to attempted murder in the first degree and the 
remaining charges and enhancements were dismissed. (R., pp.274-284.) The 
district court imposed a unified fifteen-year sentence with nine years fixed and 
ordered Crow to pay a fine of $5,000 pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. (R., pp.301-
307.) Crow filed a Rule 35 motion for leniency, asking the court to reduce his 
sentence. (R., pp.308-309.) After a hearing (see generally 11/2/12 Tr., pp.4-31), 
the district court denied Crow's motion to reduce his sentence (Supp. R., pp.39-
40). Crow filed a timely appeal. (Supp. R., pp.41-44.) 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
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ISSUES 
Crow states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in ordering a civil judgment under 
I.C. § 19-5307 based on a conviction for attempted murder? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Crow's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of 
Sentence in light of the new information offered by Mr. Crow? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court refuse to consider the legality of the $5,000 fine ordered 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307 because Crow failed to preserve that issue below? 
2. Has Crow failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his 




This Court Should Refuse To Consider The Legality Of The $5,000 Fine Ordered 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-5307 Because Crow Failed To Preserve That Issue Below 
As part of Crow's sentence for attempted first degree murder, the district 
court ordered him to pay a fine of $5,000 pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307 ("Fines in 
cases of crimes of violence"). (R., pp.301-307.) On appeal, Crow argues that 
the court erred because section (2) of that statute sets forth the specific crimes 
which carry such a fine, and attempted first degree murder is not listed among 
them. 2 (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Although Crow does not specifically assert 
that the $5,000 fine ordered as a part of his sentence was illegal, that is clearly 
the gist of his argument that the fine was not permitted under I.C. § 19-5307. 
See State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582, 288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(fines are part of the sentence). 
This Court must decline to consider the merits of Crow's claim that the 
$5,000 fine ordered as part of his sentence is illegal because it is being raised for 
the first time on appeal without having been presented to the district court in a 
Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
allows the trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time, on the motion of 
either party, and either party may appeal from the trial court's ruling. I.C.R. 35. 
2 Subsection (2) of I.C. § 19-5307 begins, "The felonies for which a fine created 
under this section may be imposed are those described in:" . . . . (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Attempted first degree murder is not included in the list 
of crimes set forth in I.C. § 19-5307(2), but "murder" is. 
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However, the claim of an illegal sentence may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal without the trial court having first had an opportunity to consider the 
legality of the terms of the sentence. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 808 
P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1991); State v. Howard, 122 Idaho 9, 10,830 P.2d 520, 521 
(1992); State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227,229,832 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748 fn1, 838 P.2d 876, 877 fn. 1 (Ct. App. 
1992). Only those issues either argued to or decided by the trial court may be 
raised on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 
(1998). 
Crow filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence but did not 
assert in the motion that his sentence was illegal. (R., pp.308-309.) 
Nevertheless, Crow argues for the first time on appeal that the district court did 
not have authority under I.C. § 19-5307 to order a $5,000 fine as part of his 
sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Because Crow did not raise the issue of 
the legality of that part of his sentence by way of a Rule 35 motion below, thereby 
depriving the district court of the opportunity to correct any alleged error, he failed 
to preserve the issue for appellate review, and this Court must decline to address 
it. 3 DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553, 961 P.2d at 644. 
3 If this Court declines to address this issue, it will be without prejudice to Crow's 
ability to file a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. If faced with a Rule 
35 motion to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court, the state may choose to 
seek one-half of the fine permitted by l.C. § 19-5307 (i.e., $2500) based on I.C. § 
18-306, which states in relevant part: 
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11. 
Crow Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Rule 35 Motion For Leniency 
A. Introduction 
Crow asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motion for leniency. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-14.) Because Crow has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, this Court must affirm the district court's 
sentencing determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
Every person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or 
is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is 
punishable, where no provision is made by law for the punishment 
of such attempts, as follows: 
(4) If the offense so attempted is punishable by a fine, the offender 
convicted of such attempt is punishable by a fine not exceeding one-half(112) the 
largest fine which may be imposed upon a conviction of the offense so 
attempted. 
If this Court reaches the merits of this issue on appeal, the state requests 
this remedy. 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
Crow's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
On appeal, Crow argues that the district court "failed to properly consider 
the mitigating factors that exist in his case" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), and cites the 
following factors: (1) it was his first felony offense, (2) his young age, (3) strong 
family support, (4) good work history (5) the diagnosis that he is bi-polar and may 
have been self-medicating with alcohol, (6) remorse for his crime, and (7) the 
psychological evaluator's opinion that he is not a danger to the general public. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-13.) The record supports the sentence originally 
imposed.4 
Crow also contends that "the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied [his] Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new 
information presented at the Rule 35 hearing." (Appellant's Brief, p.7 
(capitalization modified).) The new information Crow relies upon consists of four 
affidavits and a certificate of completion of a parenting class. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-14.) Crow fails to show that the court abused its discretion in denying his 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence based on new information. 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
4 Inasmuch as Crow's notice of appeal is timely from both his judgment of 
conviction and order denying his Rule 35 motion (see R., pp.301-303, 308-313), 
the state will address all of the factors whether "new" or not. 
8 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. kl (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 
888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. 
Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant 
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting 
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution. kl 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered Crow's 
strong family support, and noted the importance of such support to his successful 
rehabilitation. (5/8/12 Tr., p.87, L.21 - p.88, L.5; see PSI, p.9 (significant family 
information).) The court acknowledged that Crow's alcohol consumption played 
a role in his offense, but explained that it did not have a clear picture of the depth 
of his substance abuse addiction because of his lengthy incarceration. (5/8/12 
Tr., p.88, L.21 - p.89, L.5; see PSI, pp.13-14 (substance abuse comments).) 
The court discussed Dr. Linda Hatzenbuehler's psychological evaluation findings 
that Crow has a mental illness, Bipolar II, and that treatment for that condition is 
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available in a community setting. (5/8/12 Tr., p.90, L.24 - p.91, L.7; p.93, Ls.12-
16; see Supp. Exs., Def. Ex. B.) In describing Dr. Hatzenbuehler's risk 
assessment of Crow, the court recounted that she clarified that Crow's violent 
behavior occurred within the context of a domestic relationship, and "[h]is risk of 
future violence is most likely to occur in this context[.]" (5/8/12 Tr., p.91, Ls.12-
23.) The court recognized that, while Crow did not have any prior felony 
convictions, he was on misdemeanor probation at the time of the incident and 
had two misdemeanor convictions each for driving under the influence and open 
container, and one conviction for resisting and obstructing an officer. (5/8/12 Tr., 
p.94, L.23 - p.95, L.1 O; see PSI, pp.6-8.) 
One of the district court's most significant findings, based on Dr. 
Hatzenbuehler's psychological evaluation of Crow, was as follows: 
But what about more provocation or, as [the prosecutor] has 
indicated, the rejection that came in this case? 
Rather, the results of this psychological assessment suggest 
that Mr. Crow is emotionally immature, impulsive, and is dependent 
on others for attention and approval. And [Dr. Hatzenbuehler] 
restates that throughout, about how you have to be the center of 
attention, that you have strong fears of rejection, and you're prone 
to feeling helpless and overwhelmed under relatively mild threats of 
rejection, that you overcontrol your emotions. 
What [defense counsel] didn't address is the conclusion of 
that second paragraph: "When his fear of rejection surfaces, the 
normal control he maintains over his emotions decreases." That's 
exactly what happened here. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.92, L.12 - p.93, L.3; see Supp. Exs., Def. Ex. B, pp.5-6.) 
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The district court acknowledged the four sentencing factors -- protection of 
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment - as well as the factors for 
determining whether to grant probation or incarceration under I.C. § 19-2521. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.87, Ls.5-11.) The court summarized the serious nature of Crow's 
offense, attempted first degree murder, in the following way: 
You attempted to take the life of another human being. 
And based on what I see here - I know some of the - the 
one letter talked about how you were suicidal, and the position that 
it was - and I know that was what was going on in his case, an 
argument about - this struggle over the gun and that you were 
really going to kill yourself. 
But the statements that you made that are contained here in 
the PSI that only you could have her, basically, and that the gun 
was for her and the deliberate action of getting the gun and taking it 
over there shows that that's exactly what your intent was, was to 
get rid of her, to end her life, and then I would guess, more than 
likely, to take your own at that point. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.94, Ls.8-22.) The court determined that probation was not 
appropriate because it would depreciate the serious nature of the offense. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.96, Ls.6-9.) After considering all of the relevant information and 
weighing the sentencing criteria, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years with 
nine years fixed. (5/8/12 Tr., p.97, L 17 - p.98, L.1.) Given any reasonable view 
of the facts, Crow has failed to establish an abuse of the court's sentencing 
discretion. 
Crow asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction 
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of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the 
denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 
P.3d at 840. "If a sentence is found to be reasonable at the time of 
pronouncement, the defendant must then show that it is excessive in view of the 
additional information presented with the motion for reduction." State v. 
Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580, 586, 212 P.3d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1991 )). 
Crow failed to satisfy his burden of presenting additional information that shows 
his sentence is excessive. 
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Crow presented proof that he completed 
a 6-hour parenting class after he was sentenced (Supp. Exhibits, Def. Ex. A), and 
the psychological evaluation by Dr. Hatzenbuehler (Supp. Exhibits, Def. Ex. B) 
that was much discussed by the court at the time of sentencing (5/8/12 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.15-20; p.90, L.24 - p.94, L.4). The only additional or new information Crow 
presented were affidavits by (1) Audrey Crow, his sister, (2) Rebecca LaVatta, 
mother of his youngest son, (3) Brian Emfield, a criminal defense investigator, 
and (4) himself. (Supp. R., pp.22-33.) The first two affidavits variously opined 
that Crow was a "responsible person, never an angry person" who was needed 
to help raise his son (Supp. R., p.28); during three months when Crow lived with 
his sister, she had not seen him be violent toward the victim (id., p.29); and he "is 
a good caring person [who] loves his family" and helps people in need (id., p.30). 
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Crow's own affidavit stated that his objective at the time of the incident was to 
end his own life and he did not intend to harm the victim. (Supp. R., p.32.) 
To support Crow's assertion that he did not have any intent to kill or harm 
the victim, Brian Emfield, a specialized criminal investigator, averred he read and 
reviewed all the materials in the case, had gone to the scene of the crime and 
reconstructed the incident "utilizing personal interviews, witness statements and 
police reports[,]" and found Crow "was cooperative and provided factual 
information throughout the course of several interviews that were conducted." 
(Supp. R., p.23.) Mr. Emfield "found the defendant to be honest" when 
answering questions about the incident, and described the salient aspects of the 
incident - as related by Crow - in the following way: 
A struggle ensued between the parties as the weapon was pointed 
toward the victim. The victim then attempted to grab the weapon 
due to her previous martial arts and Golden Glove experience, at 
which time the weapon discharged and entered the victims [sic] 
finger and forearm. 
(Supp. R., p.25.) Mr. Emfield said that after the victim fled to the bathroom and 
locked the door, Crow "approached the door of the bathroom, holding the 
weapon in a downward position ... [and] as he stood at the doorway he was 
unaware of the fact that his finger was on the trigger and the weapon discharged 
through the lower section of the door and into the floor." (Supp. R., p.26.) 
As discussed, at the outset of the Rule 35 hearing, Crow's counsel cited 
several subject areas raised during Crow's sentencing hearing in which Crow's 
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character may have been viewed unfavorably - acceptance of responsibility, 
remorse, and the possibility he might seek revenge. (11/2/12 Tr., p.9, L.10 -
p.11, L.16.) Crow's counsel then pinpointed what was (apparently) the most 
significant basis for the Rule 35 motion - that Crow did not have the intent to kill 
or harm the victim when the gun discharged: 
His thoughts were of doing something to himself. There was never 
indication, that we're aware of, that he intended or had any set plan 
to do anything to hurt the victim. 
We think there's an argument to be made that, if in fact, he 
intended to enter that property and to confront her in that fashion 
and intended to murder her at that point, that simply a round would 
be discharged - fired at her and it would have occurred in that way. 
I think that there's - the police reports and even her 
statement, that we have reviewed at earlier dates would indicate, 
that the gun discharged when she grabbed for the gun. And I think 
there would - could have been a factual argument in terms of "Well, 
did the touching of the gun cause the discharge, or did the 
discharge happen before?" 
(11 /2/12 Tr., p.13, L.3 - p.15, L.1.) Crow's attorney concluded that "in [Crow's] 
mind, he didn't feel that there was an intent on his part to commit murder[,]" and 
requested the district court to "reduce its sentence to something close to the time 
he's done or even something like a three-plus-three and resolve this matter by 
way of granting the Rule 35 and to give him that relief at this particular point." 
(11/2/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-17.) 
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Apart from proof of completing a parenting class and character 
testimonials by Audrey Crow and Rebecca LaVatta, the only "new" information 
presented by Crow for reducing his sentence was that he did not intend to kill or 
injure the victim when the gun discharged - i.e., his guilty plea was invalid 
because he did not have the requisite intent for being convicted of attempted first 
degree murder. In short, Crow's Rule 35 claim constitutes a de facto "invalid 
guilty plea" claim which is not an appropriate basis for granting a Rule 35 motion 
to reduce a sentence. State v. Sands, 121 Idaho 1023, 1025-1026, 829 P.2d 
1372, 137 4-1375 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Clearly, a motion which challenges the 
legality of a conviction on the grounds that it was based on an invalid guilty plea 
is beyond the scope of a motion brought under Rule 35."). Therefore, Crow's 
Rule 35 motion was properly denied because it was "beyond the scope of a 
motion brought under Rule 35." Js;L; see State v. Gomez, 127 Idaho 327, 329, 
900 P.2d 803, 805 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 
694, 991 P.2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1999) (where a district court has reached a 
right result, that result will be affirmed on any correct theory). 
Moreover, in rendering its decision, the district court explained it had 
reviewed the affidavits, particularly Mr. Emfield's, and even if the victim had tried 
to grab the gun when Crow pointed it at her, it did not negate his intent to kill. 
(11/2/12 Tr., p.28, L.20 - p.29, L.25.) After reviewing some of the evidence 
presented in the PSI that showed Crow's intent to kill the victim, the court 
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concluded, "there's no question that the crime was committed that the defendant 
pied to, in this Court's mind[,]" and that "the evidence here today that's been 
added and the arguments do not sway this Court - or persuade this Court to 
adjust that sentence in any way." (11/2/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-12.) 
The district court properly denied Crow's Rule 35 motion to reduce his 
sentence because it was not presented with any compelling reason to grant such 
reduction. The mitigating factors Crow cites on appeal -- young age, no prior 
felony convictions, strong family support, good employment history, mental 
health condition, self-medication with alcohol, remorse, and not considered a 
danger to the general public -- were reflected in the record and adequately 
considered at sentencing. Those factors, individually or collectively, do not show 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying Crow's Rule 35 motion. 
Crow has failed to show either that his sentence was excessive when 
pronounced, or that it is excessive in light of additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of his motion to reduce his sentence. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
order that Crow pay a $5,000 fine under I.C. § 19-5307, and affirm the district 
court's order denying Crow's Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2013. 
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